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Abstract
In the setting of streaming interactive proofs (SIPs), a client (verifier) needs to compute a given
function on a massive stream of data, arriving online, but is unable to store even a small fraction
of the data. It outsources the processing to a third party service (prover), but is unwilling to
blindly trust answers returned by this service. Thus, the service cannot simply supply the desired
answer; it must convince the verifier of its correctness via a short interaction after the stream
has been seen.
In this work we study “barely interactive” SIPs. Specifically, we show that two or three rounds
of interaction suffice to solve several query problems – including Index, Median, Nearest Neighbor
Search, Pattern Matching, and Range Counting – with polylogarithmic space and communication
costs. Such efficiency with O(1) rounds of interaction was thought to be impossible based on
previous work.
On the other hand, we initiate a formal study of the limitations of constant-round SIPs by
introducing a new hierarchy of communication models called Online Interactive Proofs (OIPs).
The online nature of these models is analogous to the streaming restriction placed upon the verifier
in an SIP. We give upper and lower bounds that (1) characterize, up to quadratic blowups, every
finite level of the OIP hierarchy in terms of other well-known communication complexity classes,
(2) separate the first four levels of the hierarchy, and (3) reveal that the hierarchy collapses to
the fourth level. Our study of OIPs reveals marked contrasts and some parallels with the classic
Turing Machine theory of interactive proofs, establishes limits on the power of existing techniques
for developing constant-round SIPs, and provides a new characterization of (non-online) Arthur–
Merlin communication in terms of an online model.
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1 Introduction
The surging popularity of commercial cloud computing services, and more generally outsourced
computations, has revealed compelling new applications for the study of interactive proofs
with highly restricted verifiers. Consider, e.g., a retailer (verifier) who lacks the resources to
locally process a massive input (say, the set of all its transactions), but can access a powerful
but untrusted cloud service provider (prover), who processes the input on the retailer’s behalf.
The verifier must work within the confines of the restrictive data streaming paradigm, using
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only a small amount of working memory. The prover must both answer queries about the
input (say, “how many pairs of blue jeans have I ever sold?”), and prove that the answer is
correct. We refer to this general scenario as verifiable data stream computation.
It is useful to look at this computational scenario as “data stream algorithms with
access to a powerful (space-unlimited) prover.” As is well known, most interesting data
streaming problems have no nontrivial (i.e., sublinear space) algorithms unless one allows
approximation. For instance, given a stream σ of tokens from the universe [n] := {1, 2, . . . , n},
which implicitly defines frequencies fj for each j ∈ [n], some basic questions we can ask about
σ are the number of distinct tokens F0(σ), the kth frequency moment Fk(σ) =
∑n
j=1 f
k
j ,
the median of the collection of numbers in σ, and the very basic point queries where, given
a specific j ∈ [n] after σ has been presented, we wish to know fj . In each case, we would
like an exact answer, not an estimate. With the trivial exception of F1(σ) – which is just
the length of σ – not one of these questions can be answered by a (possibly randomized)
streaming algorithm restricted to o(n) space. However, with access to a powerful prover,
things improve greatly: as shown in Chakrabarti et al. [9], point queries, median, and Fk (for
integral k > 0) can be computed exactly by a verifier using O˜(
√
n) space, while receiving
O˜(
√
n) bits of “help” from the prover.
Notably, the protocol achieving this O˜(
√
n) cost (space plus amount of help) is non-
interactive: the prover sends a single message to the verifier. Chakrabarti et al. [9] also
showed that under this restriction their protocol is optimal: a cost of Ω(
√
n) is required. In
subsequent work, Cormode et al. [15] considered streaming interactive proofs (SIPs), where
the verifier may engage in several rounds of interaction with the prover, seeking to minimize
both the space used by the verifier and the total amount of communication. They gave
SIPs with 2k − 1 rounds of interaction following the verifier’s single pass over the input
stream, achieving a cost of O˜(n1/(k+1)) for the above problems. This generalizes the earlier
set of results [9], which gave 1-round SIPs. Moreover, it achieves O(polylogn) cost with
O(logn/ log logn) rounds of interaction. In recent work, Klauck and Prakash [24] further
studied this kind of computation and generalized the 1-round lower bound, claiming that a
(2k − 1)-round SIP must cost Ω(n1/(k+1)), even for very basic point queries.
However, we identify an implicit assumption in the Klauck–Prakash lower bound argument:
it applies only to protocols in which the verifier’s messages to the prover are independent of
the input. This happened to hold in all previous SIPs, which are ultimately descended from
the sum-check protocol of Lund et al. [27]. Furthermore, this assumption is harmless in the
classical theory of interactive proofs where public-coin protocols can simulate private-coin
ones with just a polynomial blowup in cost [16]. However, these simulation results fail subtly
in the streaming setting, and we show that this failure is intrinsic by giving a number of new
upper bounds.
1.1 New Results: Exponentially Improved Constant-Round SIPs
We start by showing that even two-round SIPs are exponentially more powerful than previously
believed, on certain problems. For now we state our results informally, using the O˜-notation
to suppress “lower order” factors. We give formal theorem statements later in the paper,
after all definitions are in place.
I Result 1.1 (Formalized in Theorem 3.1). There is a two-round SIP with cost O˜(logn) for
answering point queries on a stream over the universe [n].
The SIP that achieves this upper bound is based on an abstract protocol that we call the
polynomial evaluation protocol. Crucially, unlike the sum-check protocols used in previous
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SIPs, it involves an interaction where the verifier’s message to the prover depends on part of
the input; specifically, it depends on the query. Note that two rounds of interaction is likely
unavoidable in practice even if verifiability is not a concern: one round may be required for
the verifier to communicate the query to the prover, with a second round required for the
prover to reply.
Adding a third round of interaction allows us to answer selection queries, of which an
important special case is median-finding.
I Result 1.2 (Formalized in Theorem 3.7). There is a three-round SIP with cost O˜(logn) for
determining the exact median of a stream of numbers from [n].
We can in fact answer fairly complex queries with three rounds and polylogarithmic cost.
For instance, given a data set presented as a stream of points from a metric space, we can
answer exact nearest neighbor queries to the data set very efficiently, even in high dimensions.
This is somewhat surprising, given that even the oﬄine version of the problem seems to
exhibit a curse of dimensionality.
I Result 1.3 (Formalized in Theorem 3.4). For data sets consisting of points from [n]d under
a reasonable metric, such as the Manhattan distance `d1 or the Euclidean distance `d2, there is
a three-round SIP with cost poly(d, logn) allowing exact nearest neighbor queries to the data
set.
We also give similarly efficient two-round SIPs for other well-studied query problems,
such as range counting queries (Theorem 3.6), where a stream of data points is followed by a
query range and the goal is to determine the number of points in the range that appeared in
the stream, and pattern matching queries (Theorem 3.8), where a streamed text is followed
by a (short) query pattern.
Next, we work towards a detailed understanding of the subtleties of SIPs that caused the
aforementioned Klauck–Prakash lower bound [24] not to apply. Our study naturally leads
into communication complexity, in particular to Arthur–Merlin communication, which we
discuss next.
1.2 The Connection to Arthur–Merlin Communication
Like almost all previous lower bounds for data stream computations, prior SIP lower bounds [9,
24] use reductions from problems in communication complexity. To model the prover in an
SIP, the appropriate setting is Arthur–Merlin communication, which we now introduce.
Suppose Alice holds an input x ∈ X , Bob holds y ∈ Y, and they wish to compute
f(x, y) for some Boolean function f : X × Y → {0, 1}, using random coins and settling for
some constant probability of error. Say this costs R(f) bits of communication. Can an
omniscient but untrusted Merlin, who knows (x, y), convince “Arthur” (defined as Alice
and Bob together) that f(x, y) = 1, keeping the overall communication within o(R(f))?
For several interesting functions f the answer is “Yes” and this is the general subject of
Arthur–Merlin communication complexity, first considered in seminal work by Babai, Frankl,
and Simon [5].
The one-pass streaming restriction on the verifier in an SIP is modeled by requiring
that Alice not receive any communication from either Bob or Merlin. Thus the Alice–Bob
communication is one-way, though Bob and Merlin may interact arbitrarily. We refer to this
restricted communication setting as online Arthur–Merlin communication. It should be clear
that a k-round SIP with cost C can be simulated by an online Arthur–Merlin communication
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of cost C where Bob and Merlin interact for k rounds. Thus, lower bounds on SIPs would
follow from corresponding communication lower bounds in the online Arthur–Merlin setting.
At this point let us recall that the classical Turing-Machine-based theory of interactive
proofs considers two different models of interaction between prover and verifier, corresponding
to the complexity classes IPTM,1 where the verifier is allowed private randomness, and AMTM,
where he may only use public randomness. Recall the following classic results about such
interactive proofs.
Equivalence of private and public coins. Goldwasser and Sipser [16] proved that a
k-round private coin interactive proof (à la IPTM) can be simulated (with a polynomial
blowup in complexity) by a (k + 2)-round public coin one (à la AMTM). Thus, in the
resulting protocol, the verifier can perform his interaction with the prover before even
looking at the input!
Round reduction. Babai and Moran [6] proved that a (k + 1)-round interactive proof
can be simulated by a k-round interactive proof with a polynomial blowup in the verifier’s
complexity. Thus, a two-round (verifier→prover→verifier) interactive proof is just as
powerful as any constant-round one.
Interestingly, as we shall show in this work, neither of these phenomena holds for the online
communication complexity analogs of IPTM and AMTM. (Recall that “online” means that
Alice does not receive any communication from either Bob or Merlin.) This point appears to
have been missed in the Klauck–Prakash proof [24], which works in a “public coin” setting and
thus applies only to a restricted class of SIPs. The new SIPs we design in this work correspond
to a “private coin” setting, which allows the aforementioned exponential improvements.
Clearly there are nuances in online Arthur–Merlin communication complexity that do
not arise in classical interactive proofs. In particular, we seek a better understanding of the
precise role of rounds and of private randomness in the communication setting. This is the
goal of our next batch of results.
1.3 New Results: Complexity Classes for Arthur–Merlin
Communication
As noted above, we can think of AMTM as a restricted interactive proof model where the
verifier must interact with the prover before looking at his input. We can then define a
hierarchy of analogous communication complexity models called OMA[k] (Online Merlin–
Arthur), where Bob interacts with Merlin in k rounds without looking at his input, and
then Alice communicates with Bob one-way. We defer precise definitions to Section 4. The
aforementioned Klauck–Prakash lower bound essentially says the following:
I Proposition 1.4 (Klauck and Prakash [24]). The index problem – where Alice gets x ∈
{0, 1}n, Bob gets j ∈ [n] and Bob must output xj with high probability – requires Ω(n1/(k+1))
cost in the OMA[2k] model.
We can also define a parallel hierarchy OIP[k] (Online Interactive Proof) of communi-
cation analogs of IPTM. We now hit another subtlety. We could require the Bob–Merlin
interaction to happen before the Alice→Bob communication; this is how we shall define
OIP[k]. Alternatively, we could swap the order, so that Bob’s messages to Merlin could
depend on Alice’s input as well; we shall call the resulting (more powerful) model OIP[k]+ .
1 Throughout this paper, we use the subscript “TM” to denote a Turing-machine-based complexity class,
to resolve the notation clash with the analogous communication complexity classes.
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These communication models correspond to SIPs as follows. Every SIP designed prior to
this work falls into a restricted setting where the verifier’s messages are independent of the
input, so it can be simulated by an OMA[k] protocol with k being the number of rounds
of interaction in the SIP. The SIPs we design in this work apply to “query problems” with
the data set appearing before the query, and our verifier messages depend only on the query.
Thus our SIPs are naturally simulable by OIP[k] protocols. Finally, a general SIP, where
verifier messages can depend on the entire input stream, is simulable by an OIP[k]+ protocol.
Following Babai et al. [5], given a communication model C, we define a corresponding
complexity class, also denoted C, consisting of all problems that have polylogarithmic
cost protocols in the model C. We now have three parallel hierarchies of communication
complexity classes: OMA[k], OIP[k], and OIP[k]+ . For our next batch of results, we prove
several inclusion and separation results relating these newly defined classes to each other
and to well-studied classes from earlier work in communication complexity.
I Result 1.5 (Formalized over several theorems in Section 5). The following complexity class
inclusions and separations, given in Figure 1, hold.
R[1,A] R[2,B] MA[2,B] AM OMA[k]
OIP[1] OIP[2] OIP[3] OIP[4] OIP[k]
OIP[1]+ R
[3,A] OIP[2]+
Figure 1 The layout of our communication complexity zoo. An arrow from C1 to C2 indicates
that C1 ⊆ C2. If the arrow is double-headed, then the inclusion is strict. Here k > 4 is an arbitrary
constant. The models R[t,A] (resp. R[t,B]) are standard t-round randomized communication with
Alice (resp. Bob) starting. The model MA[2,B] consists of a message from Merlin followed by
Bob→Alice→Bob communication, while AM is standard (see Section 5).
Notice that there are several two-way inclusions (i.e., equalities) amongst these communica-
tion complexity classes. It is worth noting that with one exception (namely OIP[1] = OIP[1]+ )
none of these equalities is trivial. For instance, consider the switch from the model R[2,B] to
the model OIP[2]: Bob loses the ability to send Alice a message before hearing from her,
but gains access to Merlin. It is not a priori clear that this switch in models will result in
a complexity class that is even comparable to R[2,B], and nontrivial simulation arguments
(Theorems 5.3 and 5.6) are required to prove that R[2,B] = OIP[2].
Many of our simulations incur some blowup in cost. All such blowups are at most
quadratic, so polylogarithmic costs remain polylogarithmic.
The OMA and OIP hierarchies behave quite differently from the classical AMTM and
IPTM:
In contrast to the Goldwasser–Siper private-by-public-coin theorem, the class OIP[4]
is strictly more powerful than OMA[k] (in fact, even OIP[2] 6⊆ OMA[k]), for every
constant k.
In contrast to the Babai–Moran round reduction theorem, there are exactly four distinct
levels (not two) in the OIP[k] hierarchy, for constant k.
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In the course of proving the separation results in Figure 1, we obtain concrete lower
bounds for explicit functions that are of interest in their own right. Let us highlight one of
these.
I Result 1.6 (Formalized in Corollary 5.9). The set disjointness problem disj – where Alice
and Bob each get a subset of [n] and must decide whether they are disjoint – requires Ω(n1/3)
cost in the OIP[3] model and thus does not belong to the class OIP[3]. This lower bound is
tight up to a logarithmic factor.
This has implications for SIPs. We noted that all SIPs designed thus far (including the
new ones in this work) are simulable in the weaker OIP models. By a standard reduction [4]
from disj to the frequency moments problem Fk, it follows that unlike what we achieved
for point queries and median queries, based on currently known techniques, we cannot get a
polylogarithmic cost three-round SIP for Fk (k 6= 1).
Removing the qualifier “based on currently known techniques” above would require
a similar lower bound for OIP[3]+ . Unfortunately, at present we are unable to prove any
nontrivial lower bounds on OIP[2]+ , and doing so appears to be a rather difficult problem.
Indeed, this inability is what led us to study the weaker OIP model. Yet, because the OIP
models are online, the separation results in Figure 1 still morally capture the primary way in
which SIPs, due to their streaming/online nature, differ from classical interactive proofs.
Finally, our result AM = OIP[4] gives a novel characterization of AM in terms of online
communication. This is surprising because online models, where no one talks to Alice, might
be expected to be too weak to capture AM. Proving lower bounds on AM is a longstanding
and notoriously hard problem in communication complexity [26, 22, 23]. We believe our
new characterization of AM is of independent interest, and may prove useful in establishing
non-trivial AM lower bounds.
1.4 Related Work
1.4.1 Stream Computation
Early theoretical work on verifiable stream computation focused on non-interactive protocols,
as in the annotated data streams model of Chakrabarti et al. [9]. In our language, that
model corresponds to 1-round SIPs. Work in this model has established optimal protocols
for several problems including frequency moments and frequent items [9]; linear algebraic
problems such as matrix rank [24]; and graph problems like shortest s–t path [14]. Many of
these protocols have subsequently been optimized for streams whose length is much smaller
than the universe size [8]. More recent protocols, such as the Arthur–Merlin streaming
protocols of Gur and Raz [19, 8] are “barely interactive” in the sense that the prover and
the verifier may exchange a constant number of messages. Meanwhile, the fully general
streaming interactive proof (SIP) model of Cormode et al. [15, 13] permits “many” rounds
of interaction. Cormode, Thaler, and Yi [15] showed that several general IPTM protocols
can be simulated in this model. These include the powerful, general-purpose protocol of
Goldwasser, Kalai, and Rothblum [18]. Given any problem in NCTM, the resulting protocol
requires only polylogarithmic space and communication while using polylogarithmic rounds
of verifier–prover interaction. Refinements and implementations of these protocols [36, 13, 35]
have demonstrated scalability and the practicality of this line of work.
Algebraic techniques lie at the core of almost all nontrivial protocols in the above
models. Specifically, a number of 1-round SIPs are inspired by the Aaronson–Wigderson
MA communication protocol for disj [2], which is in turn inspired by the classic sum-check
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protocol of Lund et al. [27]. The sum-check protocol is also the inspiration for the way
that all previous multi-round SIPs make use of interaction. The aforementioned protocol of
Goldwasser et al. [18] also builds upon the sum-check protocol.
The algorithmic results outlined in Section 1.1 have a rather different algebraic idea at
their core. They are based on the aforementioned polynomial evaluation protocol, which is
obtained by adapting a result of Raz [33] about IP/rpolyTM to a streaming setting; see the
discussion at the start of Section 2.1.
Early work on interactive proofs studied space-bounded verifiers (see the survey by
Condon [12]), but many protocols developed in this line of work require the verifier to
store the input, and therefore do not address verifiable stream computation, as we do here.
Goldwasser et al. [17] studied interactive proofs with verifiers in the complexity class NC0TM.
Interestingly, they showed that private randomness is necessary to obtain interactive proofs
with verifiers in NC0TM, unless the language in question is already in NC0TM. This is analogous
to our finding that constant-round “public coin” SIPs (where the verifier’s messages do not
depend on the input) are exponentially weaker than general constant-round SIPs.
1.4.2 Computationally Sound Protocols
Protocols for verifiable stream computation have also been studied in the cryptography
community [10, 32, 34]. These works only require soundness to hold against cheating
provers that run in polynomial time. In exchange for this weaker security guarantee, these
protocols can achieve properties that are impossible in the information-theoretic setting we
consider. For example, they typically achieve reusability, allowing the verifier to use the
same randomness to answer many queries. In contrast, our protocols only support “one-shot”
queries, because they require the verifier to reveal secret randomness to the prover.
Chung et al. [10] combine the GKR protocol with fully homomorphic encryption (FHE)
to give reusable, non-interactive protocols of polylogarithmic cost for any problem in NC.
Papamanthou et al. [32] give improved protocols for a class of low-complexity queries
including point queries and range search: their protocols avoid the use of FHE, and allow
the prover to answer such queries in polylogarithmic time (a similar property was achieved
by Schröder and Schröder [34], but for a simpler class of queries, and with unidrectional
communication from the verifier to the prover on each stream update). In contrast, prior
work as well as our own requires the prover to spend time quasilinear in the size of the data
stream after receiving a query, even if the answer itself can be computed in sublinear time
(e.g., point queries, which can be solved with a single access to memory). We note however
that our most interesting protocols, such as those for nearest neighbor search and pattern
matching, are for problems that cannot be solved in sublinear time; hence, the quasilinear
time required by our protocols does not affect the prover’s runtime by more than logarithmic
factors.
1.4.3 Communication Complexity
Seminal work by Babai et al. [5] introduced and studied the communication analogs of the
major Turing Machine complexity classes, including P, NP, Σ2, Π2. They hinted at similar
analogs of MA and the AM hierarchy. Lokam [26] related the task of placing problems
outside of the communication class AM to notions of matrix rigidity. He also observed that
the communication complexity classes IP and AM behave similarly to their Turing Machine
counterparts. In particular, noted theorems such as IP = PSPACE, Toda’s Theorem, and
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Babai and Moran’s round reduction results [6] all hold in the communication world (though
not under online communication, as shown by this work).
Online (also known as one-round) randomized communication complexity was introduced
in the mid-1990s and considered by Ablayev [3], Kremer, Nisan, and Ron [25], and Newman
and Szegedy [29]. Aaronson [1] introduced online variants of Merlin–Arthur communica-
tion, in classical and quantum flavors. Aaronson and Wigderson [2] gave an online MA
communication protocol for disj (more generally, for inner-product) with cost O˜(
√
n);
this is nearly optimal, as shown by a lower bound of Klauck [22] that applies to general
MA protocols. More recently, Klauck [23] performed a careful study of AM, MA, and its
quantum analogue QMA. In particular, he gave a promise problem PAppMP separating
QMA from AM; we shall eventually show that PAppMP separates OIP[3] from OIP[4].
2 The SIP Model and the Polynomial Evaluation Protocol
In a data stream problem, the input σ is a stream, or sequence, of tokens from some data
universe U . The goal is to compute or approximate some function g(σ), keeping space usage
sublinear in the two key size parameters: (1) the length of σ, and (2) the size of the universe
|U |. Practically speaking, we would also like to process each stream update (token arrival)
quickly. All our data stream algorithms will be randomized, and we shall allow them to err
with some small constant probability on each input stream. In the streaming interactive
proofs (SIP) model, after processing σ, the algorithm (called the “verifier”) may engage in k
rounds of interaction with an oracle (the “prover”) who knows σ and whose goal is to lead
the verifier to output the correct answer g(σ). The verifier, being distrustful, will output “⊥”
(indicating “abort”) if he suspects the prover to be cheating.
All of the SIPs in this paper will work in the turnstile streaming model, where σ can
contain deletions of tokens from U , in addition to insertions. In this model it is best to think
of the input as being a stream of integer updates to a vector x = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ Zn. Initially
x = 0, and an update is a tuple (i, c) ∈ [n]× Z, which has the effect of adding c to the entry
xi. We will sometimes describe our algorithms as they apply to the vanilla streaming model,
but it will be straightforward to extend them to the turnstile model.
We say that an SIP computes the function g with completeness error εc and soundness
error εs if for all inputs x there exists a prover strategy that will cause the verifier to output
g(x) with probability at least 1− εc, and no prover strategy can cause the verifier to output
a value outside {g(x),⊥} with probability larger than εs. In designing SIPs, our goal will be
to achieve εc, εs ≤ 1/3; clearly the theory remains unchanged if we replace 1/3 by another
constant in (0, 1/2). A SIP with εc = 0 is said to have perfect completeness. The total length
of the verifier–prover interaction is the help cost. The space used by the streaming verifier
is the space cost. The cost of an SIP is the sum of its help cost and its space cost. When
designing SIP protocols we will also discuss the time complexities of the prover and the
verifier. To keep things simple, we consider a model in which all arithmetic operations on a
finite field of size nO(1) can be executed in unit time.
2.1 The Polynomial Evaluation Protocol
We shall present a two-round SIP for an abstract data stream problem called “polynomial
evaluation,” where the input consists of a multivariate polynomial described implicitly, as a
table of values, followed by a point at which the polynomial must be evaluated. Without
space constraints, this problem simply amounts to interpolation followed by direct evaluation,
but our goal is to obtain a protocol where the verifier uses space roughly logarithmic in the
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size of the table of values, and is convinced by the prover about the correct answer after a
similar amount of communication. For ease of presentation, we shall first consider a concrete
special setting that is important in its own right: the index problem. In this problem, the
input is a stream of n data bits x1, . . . , xn, followed by a query index j ∈ [n]. The goal is to
output xj with error at most 1/3.
With very different motivations from ours, Raz [33] gave an interactive proof protocol
placing every language in IPTM/rpoly, the class of languages that have interactive proofs
with polynomial-time verifiers that take randomized advice, where the advice is kept secret
from the prover. Our SIP for index can be seen as an adaptation of Raz’s interactive proof
to the streaming setting.
I Theorem 2.1. The index problem has a two-round SIP with cost O(logn log logn), in
which the verifier processes each stream token in O(logn) time and the prover runs in total
time O(n logn).
Proof. Assume WLOG that n = 2b, for some integer b. Identify each integer z ∈ [n] with a
Boolean vector z = (z1, . . . , zb) ∈ {0, 1}b in some canonical way, such as by using the binary
representation of z. We can then view the data bits as a table of values for the Boolean
function gx : {0, 1}b → {0, 1} given by gx(z) = xz, and thus for the multilinear b-variate
polynomial g˜x(Z1, . . . , Zb) given by
g˜x(Z1, . . . , Zb) =
∑
z∈{0,1}b
gx(z)χz(Z1, . . . , Zb) , where (1)
χu(Z1, . . . , Zb) =
b∏
i=1
(
(1− ui)(1− Zi) + uiZi
)
(2)
is the indicator function of the vector u = (u1, . . . , ub). We shall interpret g˜x as a polynomial
in F[Z1, . . . , Zb] for a fixed “large enough” finite field F. With this interpretation, g˜x is called
the multilinear extension of gx to F. We define a line in Fb to be the range of a nonconstant
affine function from F to Fb. Every line contains exactly |F| points. Given such a line, `, we
define its canonical representation to be the degree-1 polynomial λ`(W ) ∈ Fb[W ] such that
λ`(0) and λ`(1) are, respectively, the lexicographically first and second points in `. We define
the canonical restriction of a polynomial f(Z1, . . . , Zb) to ` to be the univariate polynomial
f(λ`(W )) ∈ F[W ], whose degree is at most the total degree of f .
Using the above notations and conventions, our two-round SIP for index works as shown
in Figure 2.
To analyze this protocol, first note that after reading all the data bits, the verifier would
have computed Q = g˜x(r), by Eq. (1). Now the protocol is easily seen to have perfect
completeness. Since g˜x(Z1, . . . , Zb) is multilinear, it follows that deg (g˜x(λ`(W ))) ≤ b, so the
prover can always honestly choose h(W ) = g˜x(λ`(W )). If he does so, then we will indeed
have h(t) = g˜x(λ`(t)) = g˜x(r) = Q, and the verifier’s check will pass. Finally, the verifier will
output h(w) = g˜x(λ`(w)) = g˜x(j) = xj , the correct answer to the index instance.
Next, we analyze soundness. If the prover supplies a polynomial h(W ) 6≡ g˜x(λ`(W )),
then, since both polynomials have degree at most b, they agree at at most b points in F. From
the prover’s perspective after he receives the verifier’s message, r is uniformly distributed in
` \ {j}. Thus, Prr[h(t) = Q] ≤ b/(|F| − 1) ≤ 1/3.
Now we consider this protocol’s costs. The verifier maintains the random point r ∈ Fb and
the running sum Q ∈ F, using O(b log |F|) space. He sends the prover `, which is specified by
two elements of Fb, and receives a degree-b polynomial in F[W ]; both communications use at
most O(b log |F|) bits. Recalling that |F| ≤ 6b+ 2, we see that both space and communication
costs are in O(b log b) = O(logn log logn).
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Input: Stream of data bits (x1, . . . , xn) where n = 2b, followed by index j ∈ [n].
Goal: Prover to convince Verifier to output the correct value of xj .
Shared Agreement: Finite field F with 3b+ 1 ≤ |F| ≤ 6b+ 2; bijective map u ∈ [n]←→
u ∈ {0, 1}b.
Initialization: Verifier picks r ∈R Fb uniformly at random, sets Q← 0.
Stream Processing: Upon reading xz, where z ∈ [n], Verifier updates Q← Q+xzχz(r).
Query Handling: Upon reading the index j, Verifier interacts with Prover as follows:
1. If j = r, Verifier outputs Q as the answer. Otherwise, he sends Prover `, the
unique line in Fb through j and r.
2. Prover sends Verifier a polynomial h(W ) ∈ F[W ] of degree at most b, claiming
that it is the canonical restriction of the multilinear polynomial g˜x(Z1, . . . , Zb) to
the line `. That is, Prover claims that h(W ) ≡ g˜x(λ`(W )).
3. Let w, t ∈ F be such that λ`(w) = j and λ`(t) = r. Verifier checks that h(t) = Q,
aborting if not. If the check passes, Verifier outputs h(w) as the answer.
Figure 2 A Two-Round Streaming Interactive Proof (SIP) Protocol for the index Problem
Finally, we consider the verifier’s and prover’s runtimes. The honest prover must send
the univariate polynomial g˜x(λ`(W )). Since g˜x has degree at most b, it suffices for the prover
to specify the evaluations of g˜x(λ`(W )) at b + 1 = O(logn) points. A direct application
of Qqs. (1) and (2) shows that each evaluation can be done in O(n logn) time, resulting
in a total runtime of O(n log2 n). However, using now-standard memoization techniques
(see e.g. [36, Section 5.1]), it is possible for the prover to in fact perform each of these
evaluations in just O(n) time, resulting in a total runtime of O(n logn). The verifier can
run in O(b) = O(logn) time per stream update, as each stream update xz only requires the
verifier to compute χz(r), and it follows from Eq. (2) that this can be done with O(b) field
operations. When interacting with the prover, the verifier first needs to determine the line `
through j and r, which he can do in O(b) = O(logn) time. To process the prover’s reply,
he must evaluate the polynomial h at the points t and w; these evaluations can be done in
polylogn time. J
The above SIP protocol uses very little of the special structure of the index problem.
Let us abstract out its salient features, so as to handle the general problem described at the
start of this section. First, note the protocol treats the data set given by (x1, . . . , xn) as an
implicit description of the polynomial g˜x. Second, note that our soundness analysis did not
require multilinearity per se, only an upper bound on the total degree of g˜x. Finally, note
that the specific form of Eqs. (1) and (2) is not crucial either; all we used was that it allows
the verifier an easy streaming computation. Thus, we obtain the following generic result.
I Theorem 2.2 (Polynomial Evaluation Protocol). Suppose an input data stream implicitly
describes a v-variate polynomial g of total degree d over a field F, followed by a point j ∈ Fv.
Suppose this implicit description allows a streaming verifier to evaluate g at a random
point r ∈R Fv using space S. Then the technique of the protocol in Figure 2 gives a two-
round SIP for computing g(j), with the following properties: (1) perfect completeness; (2)
soundness error bounded by d/(|F| − 1); (3) space usage in O(v log |F|+ S); (4) help cost in
O((d+ v) log |F|). J
We shall refer to the abstract protocol given by Theorem 2.2 as the polynomial evaluation
protocol.
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3 Constant-Round SIPs for Query Problems
We shall now apply the polynomial evaluation protocol to design SIPs proving the various
upper bounds outlined in Section 1.1. The first application is immediate; later applications
bring in additional ideas.
3.1 Point Queries.
In the PointQuery problem, the input is a stream in the turnstile model, updating an
initially-zero vector x ∈ Zn, followed by a query j ∈ [n]. The goal is to output xj .
I Theorem 3.1. Suppose the input to PointQuery is guaranteed to satisfy |xi| ≤ q at end
of the data stream, for all entries of x, where the bound q is known a priori. Then there is a
two-round SIP for PointQuery with space and help costs in O(logn log(q + logn)).
Proof. Assume WLOG that n = 2b for an integer b, and use a bijection u ∈ [n] ←→ u ∈
{0, 1}b as in Theorem 2.1. The vector x resulting from the updates defines a multilinear
polynomial g˜x(Z1, . . . , Zb) by Eq. (1), where gx(z) := xz. We can treat g˜x as a polynomial
over any field we like, but to solve our problem, we need to tell apart the 2q + 1 possible
values taken on by the entries of x (recall that q is an upper bound on ‖x‖∞ at the end of
the stream). For this it suffices to have char(F) ≥ 2q + 1.
Applying the polynomial evaluation protocol is now straightforward. The verifier starts
with r ∈R Fb and Q = 0. Upon receiving an update indicating “xi ← xi + c,” he updates
Q← Q+ cχi(r). The other details are as in Figure 2. The space and communication costs
are both in O(b log |F|) as before.
To ensure a soundness error of at most 1/3, we let |F| > 3b as before. This and the earlier
condition on char(F) can both be satisfied by, e.g., taking F = Fp, for a prime p > 3b+ 2q.
This translates to cost bounds in O(logn log(q + logn)), as claimed. J
3.2 Nearest Neighbor Queries
Consider a “premetric” space 2 (X , D) given by a finite ground set X and distance function
D : X ×X → R+ satisfying D(x,x) = 0 for all x ∈ X . Let BD(z, r) = {x ∈ X : D(x, z) ≤ r}
denote the corresponding ball of radius r ∈ R+ centered at z ∈ X . In the NearestNeighbor
problem, the input consists of a stream 〈x(1), . . . ,x(m)〉 of m points from X , constituting the
data set, followed by a query point z ∈ X . The goal is to output x? = arg minx(i) D(x(i), z),
the nearest neighbor of z in the data set. We shall give highly efficient SIPs for this problem
that handle rather general distance functions D. To keep our statements of bounds simple,
we shall impose the following structure on (X , D).
We assume that X = [n]d. We think of d as the dimensionality of the data, and [n]d as a
very fine “grid” over the ambient space of possible points.
For all x,y ∈ [n]d, D(x,y) ≤ 1 is an integer multiple of a small parameter ε ≥ 1/nd.
Overall, this amounts to assuming that our data set has polynomial spread: the ratio between
the maximum and minimum distance. We proceed to give two SIPs for NearestNeighbor.
Our basic SIP has cost roughly logarithmic in the stream length and the spread (and therefore
2 This very general setting, which includes metric spaces as special cases, captures several important
distance functions such as the Bregman divergences from information theory and machine learning that
satisfy neither symmetry nor the triangle inequality.
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linear in d but only logarithmic in n). After we present it, we shall critique it and then give
a more sophisticated SIP to handle its faults.
I Theorem 3.2. Under the above assumptions on the premetric space (X , D), the Near-
estNeighbor problem has a three-round SIP with cost O(d logn log(m+ log(d logn))).
Proof. Let B = {BD(x, jε) : x ∈ X , j ∈ Z, 0 ≤ j ≤ 1/ε} be the set of all balls of all
radii between 0 and 1 (quantized at granularity ε). By our assumptions on the structure
of (X , D), we have |B| ≤ nd/ε ≤ n2d. The input stream 〈x(1), . . . ,x(m)〉 defines a derived
stream, consisting of updates to a vector v indexed by the elements of B. We shall denote by
v[β] the entry of v indexed by β ∈ B. The derived stream is defined as follows: the token
x(i) increments v[β] for every ball β that contains x(i). The verifier runs the PointQuery
protocol of Theorem 3.1 on this derived stream.
The verifier learns the query point z at the end of the stream. The prover then supplies
a point y claimed to be a valid nearest neighbor (note that there may be more than one
valid answer). To check this claim, it is sufficient for the verifier to check two properties:
(1) that y did appear in the stream, and (2) that the stream contained no point closer
to z than y. The first property holds iff v[BD(y, 0)] 6= 0. The second property holds iff
v[BD(z, D(y, z)− ε)] = 0. Clearly, these two properties can be checked by two point queries
over the derived stream.
Following the protocol of Theorem 3.1, the two point queries (executed in parallel) involve
two more rounds between the verifier and the prover, for an overall three-round SIP. Since
the entries of v never exceed m, each PointQuery protocol requires space and help costs
O(d logn log(m+ log(d logn))). J
While the protocol of Theorem 3.2 achieves very small space and help costs, the prover’s
and verifier’s runtimes could be as high as Ω(nd), because processing a single stream token x(i)
may require both parties to enumerate all balls containing x(i). Ultimately, this inefficiency
is because the protocol assumes hardly anything about the nature of the distance function D
and, as a result, does not get to exploit any structural information about the balls in B.
To rectify this, we shall make the entirely reasonable assumption that the distance
function D is “efficiently computable” in the rather mild sense that membership in a ball
generated by D can be decided by a short (say, polynomial-length) formula. Accordingly,
we shall express our bounds in terms of a parameter that captures this notion of efficient
computation.
I Definition 3.3. Suppose the distance function D on X satisfies the assumptions for
Theorem 3.2. Let ΦD : B × X → {0, 1} be the ball membership function for D, i.e.,
ΦD(BD(z, r),x) = 1 ⇐⇒ x ∈ BD(z, r). Think of ΦD as a Boolean function of (3d logn)-bit
inputs. We define the formula size complexity of D, denoted fsize(D), to be the length of
the shortest de Morgan formula for ΦD.
Since addition and multiplication of b-bit integers can both be computed by Boolean
circuits in depth log b (see, e.g., [31, 37]), they can be computed by Boolean formulae of
size poly(b). It follows that for many natural distance functions D, including the Euclidean,
Hamming, `1, and `∞ metrics (and in fact `p for all suitably “small” positive p), we have
fsize(D) = poly(d, logn).
I Theorem 3.4. Suppose the premetric space (X , D) satisfies the assumptions made for
Theorem 3.2. Then NearestNeighbor on (X , D) has a three-round SIP, whose space and
help costs are both at most O(fsize(D) log(m+ fsize(D))), in which the verifier processes each
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stream update in time O(fsize(D)), and the prover runs in total time m · poly(fsize(D)). In
particular, if fsize(D) = poly(d, logn), as is the case for many natural distance functions
D, then the space and help costs are both poly(d, logm, logn), the verifier runs in time
poly(d, logn) per stream update, and the prover runs in total time m · poly(d, logn).
We defer a proof of Theorem 3.4 to the full version of the paper, but the high level idea
that allows us to avoid the high runtimes of the previous protocol is as follows. Essentially,
the SIP of Theorem 3.2 ran our polynomial evaluation protocol on a multilinear extension of
the vector v defined by the derived stream. That SIP took v to be a completely arbitrary
table of values. As a result, the verifier’s computation – evaluating the multilinear extension
at a random point – became costly. The honest prover incurred similar costs. A closer
examination of the nature of v reveals that if D is a “reasonable” distance function, then
v itself has plenty of structure. In particular, an appropriate higher degree extension of v
can in fact be evaluated much more efficiently (by both the verifier and the prover) than the
above multilinear extension.
3.3 Range Counting Queries
Let U be any data universe and R ⊆ 2U a set of ranges. In the RangeCount problem,
the data stream σ = 〈x(1), . . . ,x(m), R∗〉 specifies a sequence of universe elements x(i) ∈ U ,
followed by a query or target range R∗ ∈ R. The goal is to output |{i : x(i) ∈ R∗}|, i.e., the
number of elements in the target range that appeared in the stream.
We easily obtain a two-round streaming interactive proof for the RangeCount problem
with cost bounded by O (log |R| log (|R|m)). The verifier simply runs a PointQuery on the
derived stream σ′ defined to have data universe R. σ′ is obtained from σ as follows: on each
stream update x(i) ∈ U , the verifier inserts into σ′ one copy of each range R ∈ R such that
x(i) ∈ R. The range count problem is equivalent to a PointQuery on σ′, with the target
item being R∗, and we obtain the following theorem.
I Theorem 3.5. There is a two-round SIP with O(log |R| log(|R|m)) cost for RangeCount.
In particular, for spaces of bounded shatter dimension ρ, log |R| = ρ logm = O(logm).
The above protocol also implies a three-round SIP for the problem of linear classification,
a core problem in machine learning. Just like the protocol for NearestNeighbor invokes
a two-round protocol for index, an SIP for linear classification (find a hyperplane that
separates red and blue points) verifies that the proposed hyperplane is empty of red points
on one side and blue points on the other using the above two-round RangeCount protocol.
The prover and verifier in the protocol of Theorem 3.5 may require time Ω(|R|) per
stream update. This could be prohibitively large. However, we can obtain savings analogous
to Theorem 3.4 if we make a mild “efficient computability” assumption on our ranges.
Specifically, suppose there exists a (poly(S)-time uniform) de Morgan formula Φ of length S
that takes as input a binary string representing a point x(i) ∈ U , as well as the label of a
range R ∈ R and outputs a bit that is 1 if and only if x(i) ∈ R. We then obtain the following
more practical SIP.
I Theorem 3.6. Suppose membership in ranges from R can be decided by de Morgan formulas
of length S as above. Then there is a two-round SIP for RangeCount on R, with costs at
most O(S log(m+ S)), in which the verifier runs in time O(S) per stream update, and the
prover runs in total time m · poly(S).
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3.4 Median and Selection Queries
We give a three-round SIP for selection, of which median is a special case. In the selection
problem, defined over data universe U = [n], the data stream σ = 〈x(1), . . . ,x(m), ρ〉 is
a sequence of elements from [n], followed by a desired rank ρ ∈ [m]. For i ∈ [n], let
fi := {j : x(j) = i} denote the number of times element i appears in the stream. Given a
desired rank ρ ∈ [m], the goal is to output an element j ∈ [n] such that∑
k<j
fk < ρ and
∑
k>j
fk ≤ m− ρ. (3)
median is the special case of selection when ρ = bm/2c.
Our three-round SIPs for selection essentially work by reducing to the RangeCount
problem, but an extra round is required for the prover to send the desired element j to the
verifier.
I Theorem 3.7. There is a three-round SIP for selection with cost at most O(logn log(m+
logn)) in which the verifier runs in time poly(logn, logm) per update, and the prover runs
in total time m · poly(logn, logm).
The proof of Theorem 3.7 is deferred to the full version of the paper.
3.5 Pattern Matching Queries
In the pattern matching with wildcards problem, denoted pmw, we are given a stream σ
representing text T = (t1, . . . , tm) ∈ {0, 1, ∗}m followed by a pattern P = (p1, . . . , pq) ∈
{0, 1, ∗}q. The wildcard symbol ∗ is interpreted as “don’t care”, and the pattern P is said
to occur at location i in t if, for every position j in P , either pj = ti+j or at least one
of pj and ti+j is the wildcard symbol. The pmw problem is to determine the number of
locations at which P occured in T . PatternMatching refers to the special case where
“don’t care” symbols are not permitted. We focus on a binary alphabet; a larger alphabet U
can be handled by replacing each character in U with its binary representation, growing the
parameter q by a factor of log |U |.
Pattern matching, both with and without wildcards, has been extensively studied within
the algorithmic literature, with applications ranging from internet search to computational
genetics (see e.g. [11, 20] and the references therein). Verifiable protocols for pattern
matching enable searching in the cloud, and complements work on searching in encrypted
data within the cloud (e.g. [7]). Cormode et al. [13] described and implemented an SIP
for pmw that required roughly Θ(log2m) rounds and had space help costs bounded by
Θ˜(log2m); Concretely, their implementation required well over 1,000 rounds, even for quite
small streams (of length 217). In stark contrast, our new protocol requires the optimal
number of rounds: two.
I Theorem 3.8. There is a 2-round SIP for pmw with space and help costs at most O(q log(q+
m)), in which the verifier runs in time O(q) per stream update, and the prover runs in total
time m · poly(q).
The proof of Theorem 3.8 is deferred to the full version of the paper. We remark that
the pmw protocol of Theorem 3.8 can be run even if the verifier only knows an upper bound
on the length q of the pattern. This is because, for any q′ ≤ q, a pattern P ′ ∈ {0, 1, ∗}q′ is
equivalent to the pattern P ∈ {0, 1, ∗}q obtained from P ′ by concatenating q − q′ wildecard
symbols to P ′.
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4 Communication Protocols and Complexity Classes
We now turn to the study of communication complexity classes motivated by a desire to
understand streaming interactive proofs (SIPs) from a complexity-theoretic viewpoint. In
this section, we lay out the necessary definitions and terminology to rigorously discuss the
notions outlined in Section 1.3. In the next section we prove the many parts of Result 1.5.
4.1 Definitions
Communication problems arise naturally out of data stream problems if we suppose Alice
holds a prefix of the input stream, and Bob the remaining suffix. The primary goal of such
reductions is to obtain space lower bounds on data stream algorithms, so we are free to split
the stream at any place we like. For example, most data stream problems in Section 3 are
query problems, where the input consists of a streamed data set, S, followed by a query, q, to
apply to S. In this case, it would be natural to split the input by giving S to Alice and q to
Bob. Communication problems that will play an important role in this paper include the index
problem index : {0, 1}n × [n] → {0, 1} where [n] := {1, . . . , n} and index(x, j) = xj , the
set-intersection and set-disjointness problems inter, disj : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}n → {0, 1} where
inter(x, y) = ¬disj(x, y) = ∨ni=1(xi ∧ yi), and the median relation med : [n]m × [n]m → [n],
where inputs x, y ∈ [n]m × [n]m are interpreted as two halves of a list of numbers, and the
valid output(s) corresponds to the median(s) of the combined list.
4.1.1 Communication Complexity Classes
All our communication models provide random coins and allow two-sided error probability up
to a constant; when unspecified, this constant defaults to 1/3. Given a communication model
C, we denote the corresponding complexity measure of a problem f by C(f). Following
Babai et al. [5], we also denote by C the corresponding complexity class, defined as the set
of all functions f : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}n → {0, 1} such that C(f) = (logn)O(1), i.e., functions
that are “easy” in the model C.
We let R[k,A] denote the model of randomized communication complexity where Alice
and Bob exchange k ≥ 1 messages in total with Alice sending the first; R[k,B] is similar,
except that Bob starts. In the MA model, the super-player Merlin, who sees all of the
input, broadcasts a message at the start, following which Alice and Bob run a (two-way,
arbitrary-round) randomized “verification” protocol. The MA[k,A] and MA[k,B] models are
restrictions of MA where Merlin speaks only to Bob 3 and the verification protocol following
Merlin’s single message is restricted to lie in R[k,A] and R[k,B] respectively.
The MA model (indeed, its restriction MA[1,A]) allows us to simulate 1-round SIPs in
an obvious way: Merlin sends Bob the prover’s message, and Alice sends Bob the verifier’s
memory contents after it has processed her prefix of the stream. Notice that the order of the
two messages is not important, modulo one crucial consideration: Alice must have a private
channel to Bob and the random coins used to generate the message from Alice to Bob must
be hidden coins, invisible to Merlin but shared between Alice and Bob (which is why we
called them “hidden coins” rather than “private coins”).
The models OMA[k], OIP[k], and OIP[k]+ , for k ≥ 1, are obtained by extending MA[1,A]
to simulate k-round SIP protocols. These communication models work as follows. In each
3 Our definition breaks symmetry between Alice and Bob because our eventual goal is to study online
protocols.
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case, Alice and Bob first toss some hidden coins. Then, upon receiving the input, two things
happen: (1) Merlin and Bob interact for k rounds, with Merlin sending the last message in
the interaction, and (2) Alice sends Bob a message, randomized using the hidden coins. After
these actions are completed, Bob produces an output in {0, 1}. The differences between the
three series of models are as follows.
In OMA[k], (1) happens before (2) and Bob must interact with Merlin before looking at
his input. This is directly analogous to AMTM; see the discussion in Section 1.2.
In OIP[k], (1) happens before (2) and Bob may look at his input before talking to Merlin.
Finally, OIP[k]+ is like OIP
[k] except that (2) happens before (1). Thus, Bob’s messages
may depend on Alice’s actual message to Bob, not just on Bob’s input and the hidden
coins.
In the AM model, the parties first choose a public random string, then Merlin broadcasts a
message to Alice and Bob, who then run a deterministic communication protocol to arrive
at a Boolean output. Since Merlin can in fact predict the exact transcript that Alice and
Bob will generate following his message, we can assume without loss of generality that after
Merlin’s message, Alice and Bob output one bit each indicating whether or not they accept
Merlin’s prediction.
4.1.2 Cost and Value of Protocols
Let P be a protocol in a model C involving Merlin. For each input (x, y), P defines a game
between Merlin and Arthur (recall that Alice and Bob together constitute Arthur), wherein
Merlin’s goal is to make Arthur output 1. We define the value V P(x, y) to be Merlin’s
probability of winning this game with optimal play. Given a Boolean function f , we say that
P computes f with soundness error εs and completeness error εc if, for all x, y we have
f(x, y) = 0 ⇒ V P(x, y) ≤ εs , and f(x, y) = 1 ⇒ V P(x, y) ≥ 1− εc . (4)
When the above holds with εc = 0, we say that P computes f with perfect completeness.
The verification cost of P , denoted vc(P), is the (worst-case) number of bits sent by Alice
plus the number of hidden coin tosses; its help cost hc(P) is the number of bits communicated
between Merlin and Bob; its communication cost cc(P) = hc(P) + vc(P). For a problem
f , we define its complexity C(f) = min{cc(Q) : Q is a C protocol that solves f with
max{εs, εc} ≤ 1/3}.
4.2 Relations Among Communication Complexity Classes
We prove a number of inclusion and separation results among our “new” communication
complexity classes and relate them to previously studied classes. These are summarized in
Figure 1, replicated below.
Our results shed light on the landscape of online communication complexity in general.
The simplest online communication model is R[1,A], a.k.a. one-way randomized com-
munication. The result OIP[1] = OIP[1]+ = R
[1,A] establishes that in the world of online
communication, introducing the omniscient but untrusted Merlin into the model is not
enough to obtain super-polynomial efficiency improvements, if interaction with Merlin is not
permitted. The stronger result that OMA[k] = R[1,A] for all constants k > 0 (this is the
full statement of Theorem 5.20) establishes that in the “public coin” setting, the addition of
Merlin is not enough to obtain super-polynomial speedups even if interaction with Merlin is
permitted.
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R[1,A] R[2,B] MA[2,B] AM OMA[k]
OIP[1] OIP[2] OIP[3] OIP[4] OIP[k]
OIP[1]+ R
[3,A] OIP[2]+
Figure 3 The layout of our communication complexity zoo. An arrow from C1 to C2 indicates
that C1 ⊆ C2. If the arrow is double-headed, then the inclusion is strict. Within the figure, k is an
arbitrary constant larger than 4.
The result that OIP[2] = R[2,B] (see Corollary 5.7) establishes that in the “hidden coin”
setting, the addition of Merlin to the communication model can yield super-polynomial
efficiency improvements, even if only the barest amount of interaction with Merlin is permitted.
However, note that R[2,B] is the simplest non-online communication model. Thus the
combination of hidden coins and a minimal amount of interaction is enough to simulate only
the simplest of the non-online communication protocols.
The result that OIP[4] = OIP[4]+ = AM (see Corollary 5.14) shows that in the “hidden
coin” setting, the addition of Merlin to the communication model permits the simulation
even of non-online interactive proofs, as soon as four rounds of interaction with Merlin are
permitted.
This in turn explains the somewhat puzzling result that the OIP and OIP+ hierarchies
collapse to the fourth level: both Goldwasser–Sipser [16] and Babai–Moran [6] break down
in the OIP and OIP+ worlds because their transformations do not preserve online-ness:
they will turn an OIP[2] protocol into a “public coin” one, but require Merlin to send a
message to Alice. However, as soon as four rounds of interaction with Merlin are permitted,
even online interactive proofs can simulate non-online ones. At this point, the phenomena of
classical interactive proofs kick in, and the hierarchies collapse.
5 A Communication Complexity Zoo
We now study our central communication models OIP[k] and OIP[k]+ , and prove the web of
relationships given in Figure 3. Our results are of two types: (1) establishing separations
or collapses between levels of the OIP and OIP+ hierarchies, as the case may be, and
(2) relating these hierarchies to other previously studied communication complexity classes.
We shall first characterize every finite level of the OIP hierarchy (the vertical bidirectional
arrows in Figure 3). Next, in Sections 5.4 and 5.5, we separate the first four levels of the
hiearchy (the horizontal double-headed arrows in the figure). Finally, in Section 5.5, we
separate the OIP and OMA hierarchies.
Throughout Section 5, f will denote an arbitrary communication problem given by a
Boolean function f : X × Y → {0, 1}, and n will parametrize its “instance size” up to a
constant factor, i.e., we will have log |X | + log |Y| = Θ(n). We shall use big-O and big-Ω
notation to hide constants independent of f , |X | and |Y|. We shall use the term “ordinary
protocol” to mean a randomized communication protocol involving Alice and Bob alone (and
no Merlin).
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The first level of the hierarchy is easy to characterize.
I Theorem 5.1. We have OMA[1] = OIP[1] = OIP[1]+ = MA[1,A] = R[1,A].
Proof. The definitions immediately show that the first four classes are identical (syntactically)
and include R[1,A], because one can always choose to ignore Merlin. The reverse inclusion
MA[1,A] ⊆ R[1,A] follows from previous work: Chakrabarti et al. [9] show that for all f we
have R[1,A](f) = O
(
MA[1,A](f)2
)
. J
5.1 A Characterization of OIP[2]
The main goal of this subsection is to prove that OIP[2] = R[2,B]. We start with the
following communication analog of Theorem 2.2, which was proven in a streaming setting.
I Lemma 5.2 (Polynomial Evaluation Protocol, Communication Version). Suppose Alice holds
a v-variate polynomial g of total degree d over a field F, and Bob holds a point j ∈ Fv. Assume
|F| > 4d. Then there is an OIP[2] protocol with communication cost O((v + d) · log |F|) for
evaluating g(j). In particular, OIP[2](index) = O(logn log logn), so that index ∈ OIP[2].
Proof. Using the notation established in the description of the polynomial agreement protocol
of Section 2.1, we simply note that the hidden coins shared between Alice and Bob determine
r. Bob can send Merlin (the canonical representation of) the line ` that passes through j
and r without having to hear from Alice, since ` is determined entirely by r and Bob’s input
j. Merlin can send Bob the polynomial h(W ) claimed to equal g restricted to the line `, and
Alice can send Bob g(r) within the stated cost bounds. Bob performs the same check as the
verifier in Theorem 2.2, and the completeness and soundness analysis is unchanged. J
The just-proved fact that index ∈ OIP[2] is striking: combined with the well-known
lower bound R[1,A](index) = Ω(n), it shows that introducing Merlin into the picture while
keeping the one-way restriction on the Alice/Bob communication lowers cost exponentially.
It is now natural to ask whether OIP[2] allows such exponential savings for harder problems,
such as disj. Our next result – a lower bound on OIP[2] complexity – implies that it does
not.
I Theorem 5.3. Let P be an OIP[2] protocol computing f . Then hc(P) vc(P) = Ω(R[2,B](f)).
In particular, OIP[2](f) = Ω
(
R[2,B](f)1/2
)
, which implies OIP[2] ⊆ R[2,B].
Proof. After appropriate parallel repetition, we may assume that the soundness and com-
pleteness errors of P at most 1/12 each. In general, P takes the following shape: (1) hidden
coins are tossed, generating random string r according to distribution D; (2) Bob sends
Merlin a message mB = mB(y, r); (3) Merlin responds with a message mM = mM (x, y,mB);
(4) Alice sends Bob a message mA = mA(x, r); (5) Bob outputs a bit given by a function
outP (y,mM ,mA).
Let Dm be D conditioned on the event {mB(y, r) = m}. Note that the distribution Dm
depends on both y and m. Since Bob knows y, Bob can determine the distribution Dm for
any value of m (this is not, however, true for Alice, because Alice does not know y).
With this notational setup, we now describe (in Figure 4) a two-message ordinary protocol
Q that we claim computes f .
To analyze this protocol, let us first define the weight Wx,y(m) of a Bob-message m to be
the probability that Merlin, playing optimally after receiving m, convinces Bob to output 1.
That is,
Wx,y(m) = max
mM
Pr
r∼Dm
[
outP(y,mM ,mA(x, r)) = 1
]
. (5)
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1. Bob samples r ∼ D, computes m = mB(y, r), then sends Alice i.i.d. samples
r(1), . . . , r(h) ∼ Dm, where h = 36(hc(P) + 4).
2. Alice sends Bob mA
(
x, r(1)
)
, . . . ,mA
(
x, r(h)
)
.
3. Bob outputs 1 iff ∃mM : |{i ∈ [h] : outP(y,mM ,mA(x, r(i))) = 1}| > h/2.
Figure 4 The R[2,B] protocol Q, which simulates the OIP[2] protocol P.
Then, withm ∼ mB(y,D), the expected weight Em[Wx,y(m)] is at least 11/12 when f(x, y) =
1 and at most 1/12 when f(x, y) = 0.
Correctness on 1-inputs: Fix (x, y) ∈ f−1(1). We shall proceed assuming that the
specific Bob-message m chosen in Step 1 of Q satisfies Wx,y(m) > 2/3 = 1 − 4(1/12); by
Markov’s inequality, this fails to happen with probability at most 1/4. Studying Eq. (5) tell
us that there exists a specific Merlin-message m∗M such that Prr[outP(y,m∗M ,mA(x, r)) =
1] > 2/3. Therefore, according to the strategy in Steps 2 and 3, the size of the set
{i ∈ [h] : outP(y,m∗M ,mA(x, r(i))) = 1} is a sum of h i.i.d. indicators and exceeds 2h/3 in
expectation. By standard Chernoff bounds (e.g., [28, Theorem 4.4]), the probability that
Bob outputs 0 is 2−Ω(h). Thus, overall, the probability that Q outputs 0 on input (x, y) is at
most 1/4 + 2−Ω(h) < 1/3.
Correctness on 0-inputs: Fix (x, y) ∈ f−1(0). We shall proceed assuming that the specific
Bob-message m chosen in Step 1 of Q satisfies Wx,y(m) < 1/3; by Markov’s inequality, this
fails to happen with probability at most 1/4. For each specific Merlin-message mM , define
size(mM ) =
∣∣∣{i ∈ [h] : outP(y,mM ,mA(x, r(i))) = 1}∣∣∣ .
Then size(mM ) is a sum of h i.i.d. indicators and has expectation below h/3. By standard
Chernoff bounds, Pr[size(mM ) > h/2] ≤ e−h/36. By a union bound over all possible Merlin-
messages mM , the probability that Bob outputs 1 is at most 2hc(P)e−h/36 < 2−4, using our
choice of h. Adding in the 1/4 from our Markov argument earlier, the overall probability
that Q outputs 1 on input (x, y) is at most 1/4 + 2−4 < 1/3.
Communication Cost: By definition of the OIP[2] model, we have |r| ≤ vc(P) and
|mA| ≤ vc(P). Thus, each of the two messages in Q costs at most h ·vc(P) = O(hc(P) vc(P))
bits. J
The above proof exploits a key property of OIP[2] protocols: Bob can sample from the
conditional distribution Dm. This is possible because mB = mB(y, r) is independent of
Alice’s message mA, a property not satisfied in the stronger OIP[2]+ model. This explains
why Theorem 5.3 does not apply to OIP[2]+ , and indeed we shall later give an exponential
separation between OIP[2] and OIP[2]+ in Corollary 5.19.
Theorem 5.3 implies a number of lower bounds for specific problems. We begin with disj.
I Corollary 5.4. We have Ω(n1/2) ≤ OIP[2](disj) ≤ O(n1/2 logn). In particular, disj /∈
OIP[2].
Proof. For the lower bound, we combine Theorem 5.3 with the fact that R[2,B](disj) ≥
R(disj) = Ω(n), the last step being a celebrated lower bound [21]. The upper bound follows
from the Aaronson–Wigderson protocol [2] for disj, which is in fact an MA[1,A] protocol. J
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We remark that we may replace disj in Corollary 5.4 with ip2, the “inner product mod 2”
function. Indeed, the Aaronson–Wigderson protocol also applies to ip2, and R(ip2) = Ω(n).
Recall that med is a relation on inputs in [n]m × [n]m. Corollary 5.5 below establishes a
lower bound of Ω(m1/4) on the cost of any OIP[2] protocol for med (the proof is deferred to
the full version of the paper). This justifies our use of three rounds in the polylogarithmic
cost SIP for median we gave in Theorem 3.7, as it implies that any 2-round SIP for median
based on known techniques must have polynomial cost.
I Corollary 5.5. We have Ω(m1/4) ≤ OIP[2](med) ≤ O(m1/2 log3/2 n).
We have now seen that up to polynomial (specifically, quadratic) blowup, OIP[2] is no
more powerful than ordinary R[2,B]. We now show that up to another quadratic blowup this
is in fact a characterization.
I Theorem 5.6. For all f , we have OIP[2](f) = O
(
R[2,B](f)2
)
. In particular, OIP[2] ⊇
R[2,B].
Proof. Let Q be an R[2,B] protocol for f with cost C and error at most 1/6. Assume WLOG
that C ≥ 5 and that each of the two messages in Q is a string in {0, 1}C . We shall treat
Alice’s messages as elements of the field F = F2C via an agreed-upon bijection.
We design an OIP[2] protocol P for f , based on Q. Given an input (x, y), P begins
by choosing a (hidden) random string r shared between Alice and Bob exactly as Q would
have. From now on, think of x, y, r as fixed. This then fixes a message mB that Bob would
have sent Alice in Q, as well as a function mA : {0, 1}C → F specifying Alice’s response to
each Bob-message. Let m˜A(Z1, . . . , ZC) ∈ F[Z1, . . . , ZC ] be the multilinear extension of this
function mA. In P, Alice needs to send a message to Bob that allows him to determine
mA(mB) = m˜A(mB) with Merlin’s help. This is an instance of polynomial evaluation, so we
solve it by applying the OIP[2] polynomial evaluation protocol (PEP) from Lemma 5.2.
The polynomial m˜A is C-variate and has total degree C. Therefore, PEP has commu-
nication cost O(C log |F|) = O(C2), as does P. Next, PEP has perfect completeness, so an
honest Merlin can cause P to output 1 whenever the choice of r would have caused Q to
output 1. Finally, PEP has soundness error at most C/(|F| − 1) = C/(2C − 1) < 1/6, so a
dishonest Merlin can cause P to differ in output from Q with probability at most 1/6. Using
the error bound of 1/6 on Q, we conclude that P has completeness error at most 1/6 and
soundness error at most 1/6 + 1/6 = 1/3. J
I Corollary 5.7. For all f , we have Ω
(
R[2,B](f)1/2
) ≤ OIP[2](f) ≤ O(R[2,B](f)2). Thus,
OIP[2] = R[2,B].
Proof. Combine Theorems 5.3 and 5.6. J
5.2 A Characterization of OIP[3]
The main goal of this subsection is to prove that OIP[3] = MA[2,B]. Theorem 5.8 below
gives a lower bound that builds on the argument in Theorem 5.3 (the proof is deferred to the
full version of the paper). Just as before, we can then derive a lower bound for the specific
problem disj.
I Theorem 5.8. Let P be an OIP[3] protocol computing f . Then there is an MA[2,B]
protocol Q computing f with hc(Q) ≤ hc(P) and vc(Q) = O(hc(P) vc(P)). In particular,
OIP[3](f) = Ω
(
MA[2,B](f)1/2
)
, which implies OIP[3] ⊆MA[2,B].
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I Corollary 5.9. We have Ω(n1/3) ≤ OIP[3](disj) ≤ O(n1/3 logn). In particular, disj /∈
OIP[3].
Proof. Klauck [22] proved that MA(disj) = Ω(n1/2). Applying Theorem 5.8 to this result
gives the non-tight bound OIP[3](disj) = Ω(n1/4). But we observe that Klauck’s proof shows
something stronger: namely, if an MA protocol Q computes disj, then hc(Q) vc(Q) = Ω(n).
Combining Theorem 5.8 with this result, we conclude that if an OIP[3] protocol P computes
disj, then hc(P)2 vc(P) = Ω(n), and therefore hc(P) + vc(P) = Ω(n1/3).
For the upper bound, we note that Aaronson and Wigderson [2] also gave an online
MAMA protocol for disj of cost O(n1/3 logn). Every online MAMA protocol admits a
simulation in OIP[3]. J
As with Corollary 5.4, we may replace disj in the above result with ip2. Indeed, Klauck’s
result [22] implies that MA(ip2) = Ω(n1/2), and Aaronson and Wigderson’s MAMA protocol
also applies to ip2.
As we did for the second level in the OIP hierarchy, we give an upper bound that applies
to the third level and gives a characterization that is tight up to a quadratic blowup.
I Theorem 5.10. For all f , we have OIP[3](f) = O
(
MA[2,B](f)2
)
. In particular, OIP[3] ⊇
MA[2,B].
Proof sketch. We build on the argument in Theorem 5.6 exactly as the proof of Theorem 5.8
builds on Theorem 5.3. Given an MA[2,B] protocol Q of cost C, the verification strategy
used by Alice and Bob in Q is an R[2,B] protocol of cost C, which we can replace with an
OIP[2] protocol of cost O(C2), by Theorem 5.6. After this replacement we have an OIP[3]
protocol. The remaining analysis is routine. J
I Corollary 5.11. For all f , Ω
(
MA[2,B](f)1/2
) ≤ OIP[3](f) ≤ O(MA[2,B](f)2). Thus,
OIP[3] = MA[2,B].
Proof. Combine Theorems 5.8 and 5.10. J
5.3 A Characterization of OIP[4] and Beyond
The fourth level of the OIP hierarchy turns out to have surprising power. It can capture
all of AM, a model that lies at the frontier of our current understanding of communication
complexity classes in the sense that we do not know any nontrivial AM lower bounds.
Thanks to this surprising power, we can show that all constant-height levels of the OIP
hierarchy collapse to the fourth level.
I Theorem 5.12. For all f , we have OIP[4](f) = O(AM(f) log AM(f)). In particular,
OIP[4] ⊇ AM.
Proof. Suppose AM(f) = C. WLOG, there is a protocol Q for f with the following shape:
Bob tosses coins to generate a random string r and sends it to Merlin, who responds with a
message m, where |r|+ |m| ≤ C. Bob then sends (r,m) to Alice, who responds with a single
bit, after which Bob announces the output.
The interaction between Bob and Alice is an R[2,B] protocol (in fact, it is deterministic)
of cost C. Theorem 5.6 shows that it can be replaced with an OIP[2] protocol of cost O(C2).
Performing this replacement gives us an OIP[4] protocol for f . The cost bound can be
improved to O(C logC) by revisiting the analysis of the polynomial evaluation protocol used
to prove Theorem 5.6 and using the fact that Alice’s message in Q is just a single bit. J
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I Theorem 5.13. For each k > 0, there exists a constant ck > 0 such that for all
f , OIP[k]+ (f) ≥ Ω
(
AM(f)ck
)
. In particular, for every constant k, we have OIP[k]+ ⊆ AM.
Proof. Let C = OIP[k]+ (f) and let P be an OIP[k]+ protocol with cost C that computes f . By
definition, P uses a hidden random string and Merlin learns about this string only indirectly,
from Bob’s computed messages. We apply the Goldwasser–Sipser set lower bound technique
[16] to convert P into a protocol where all random coins are directly revealed. Specifically,
we can convert P into an AMAM · · ·AM protocol Q′, where k + 3 messages are sent in
total: Merlin’s messages are broadcast and after his final message Alice sends a message to
Bob, who announces the output. We have cc(Q′) = O(Cak) for some constant ak ≥ 1.
We apply Babai and Moran’s round elimination techniques [6] to turn Q′ into a standard
AM protocol Q of cost at most O(cc(Q′)bk) for some constant bk ≥ 1. The result follows by
taking ck = 1/(akbk). J
I Corollary 5.14. For all f , Ω
(
AM(f)c4
) ≤ OIP[4](f) ≤ O(AM(f) log AM(f)), where c4 is
the constant from Theorem 5.13. In particular, OIP[4] = AM, and in fact OIP[k] = AM
for every constant k ≥ 4.
Proof. Combine Theorems 5.13 and 5.12, noting that OIP[k] ⊆ OIP[k]+ for every k ≥ 4. J
Here is an interesting point worth contemplating. On the one hand, our transformations in
the proof of Theorem 5.13 perform round reduction at the expense of destroying online-ness:
the final protocol Q is no longer online, i.e., we cannot require communications to go to
Bob alone. On the other hand, the transformation in the proof of Theorem 5.12 “restores”
onlineness at only a “slight” expense of requiring four rounds, whereas AM uses only two.
Overall, we have a collapse of the OIP hierarchy to its fourth level.
We have also noted earlier that we (regretfully) do not yet know how to place a concrete
problem outside OIP[2]+ . Nevertheless, Theorems 5.12 and 5.13 together establish a weakness
of OIP[2]+ : up to polynomial factors this model is no more powerful than OIP
[4].
5.4 Exponential Separations in Our Complexity Zoo
Among the first four levels of the OIP hierarchy, we can now show that every pair of adjacent
levels is exponentially separated. The next three results make this precise. Recall that
inter = ¬disj is the set intersection problem.
I Theorem 5.15. We have OIP[1](index) = Ω(n1/2) whereas OIP[2](index) = O(logn log logn).
Proof. Combine Theorems 5.1 and Lemma 5.2, and then the known results that MA[1,A](f) =
Ω
(
R[1,A](f)1/2
)
for all f [9] (see also Theorem 5.20 in Section 5.5), and that R[1,A](index) =
Ω(n) [3]. J
I Theorem 5.16. We have OIP[2](inter) = Ω(n1/2) whereas OIP[3](inter) = O(log2 n).
Proof. For the lower bound, use R[2,B](inter) ≥ R(inter) = R(disj) = Ω(n) and then
apply Theorem 5.3.
For the upper bound, note that inter has a nondeterministic protocol with cost O(logn),
wherein Alice and Bob guess an element in the intersection of their respective sets and they
verify membership. In particular this gives MA[2,B](inter) = O(logn); in fact, Bob need
not send anything to Alice in the MA[2,B] protocol. Now apply Theorem 5.10. J
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While we do not know of a total Boolean function that separates OIP[3] from OIP[4],
we do know of a partial Boolean function whose OIP[3] communication complexity is
exponentially larger than its OIP[4] communication complexity. Specifically, Klauck [23,
Corollary 3] gives a promise problem he calls PAppMP which has Quantum Merlin-Arthur
(QMA) communication complexity Ω(n1/6) and AM communication complexity O(logn).
Since Theorem 5.8 shows that any OIP[3] protocol can be transformed into an equivalent
MA[2,B] protocol with a quadratic blowup in cost, and MA[2,B] protocols are simply
restricted versions of QMA protocols, Klauck’s lower bound on the QMA cost of PAppMP
implies that OIP[3](PAppMP) = Ω(n1/12).
Meanwhile, Theorem 5.12 shows that any AM communication protocol can be transformed
into an equivalent OIP[4] protocol with a logarithmic blowup in costs. Thus, Klauck’s upper
bound on the AM communication complexity of PAppMP implies that OIP[4](PAppMP) =
O(logn log logn).
I Theorem 5.17. We have OIP[3](PAppMP) = Ω(n1/12) whereas OIP[4](PAppMP) =
O(logn log logn).
Next, we show that, up to polynomial factors, OIP[2]+ is at least as powerful as R
[3,A],
the class of three-message randomized communication protocols in which Alice speaks first.
This will enable us to exhibit an explicit function f on domain {−1, 1}n × {−1, 1}n such
that OIP[2](f) = Ω(
√
n/ logn), while OIP[2]+ (f) = O(log2 n).
I Theorem 5.18. For all f , we have OIP[2]+ (f) = O
(
R[3,A](f)2
)
.
Proof. Let Q be any three-message randomized communication protocol of cost C, with
Alice speaking first. We show how to convert Q into an OIP[2]+ protocol P of cost O(C2).
We think of Q as consisting of one message m(1)A from Alice to Bob, followed by a
two-message communication protocol Q′ in which Bob speaks first. Theorem 5.6 shows
how to transform Q′ into an equivalent OIP[2] protocol P ′ of cost O(C2) (note this OIP[2]
protocol depends on m(1)A ).
Thus, we obtain an OIP[2]+ protocol P as follows. Alice’s message to Bob in P consists
of two parts. The first specifies m(1)A , and the second is the message she would have sent to
Bob in P ′. Bob, who learns m(1)A from the first part of Alice’s message, now knows what
OIP[2] protocol P ′ to execute, and simply behaves the same as he would in P ′. J
Exponential separations between R[3,A] and R[2,B] are known. In particular, consider
the k-step (bipartite) pointer jumping function pjk, which interprets each of Alice and Bob’s
inputs as a list of N = Θ(n/ logn) pointers, a pointer being a (logN)-bit integer. Each
pointer in a player’s list is interpreted as pointing to (i.e., indexing) a pointer in the other
player’s list. The goal is to follow these pointers, starting at the first pointer in Alice’s list,
and output the kth pointer encountered. For example, if Alice’s input is x = (00, 01, 10, 00)
and Bob’s input is y = (01, 10, 11, 00), then pj1(x, y) = 01, pj2(x, y) = 01, pj3(x, y) = 10,
and so on. To turn pjk into a Boolean function bpjk, we take the parity of the (logN)-bit
output of pjk.
I Corollary 5.19. We have OIP[2](bpj2) = Ω(
√
n/ logn), while OIP[2]+ (bpj2) = O(log2 n).
Proof. Nisan and Wigderson [30] showed that R[k,B](bpjk) = Ω(N/k2 − k logN). In partic-
ular, any two-message randomized communication protocol in which Bob speaks first has
cost Ω(N). Hence, Theorem 5.3 implies that OIP[2](bpj2) = Ω(
√
n/ logn).
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To prove the upper bound on OIP[2]+ (bpj2), note that there is a trivial three-message
protocol for pj2 (and hence for bpj2) of cost O(logn) in which Alice speaks first. Now apply
Theorem 5.18. J
5.5 An Exponential Separation Between OIP[2] and OMA[k]
Theorem 5.20 establishes that for any function f , OMA[2k](f) = Ω
(
R[1,A](f)1/(k+1)
)
. An
essentially identical lower bound was proven by Klauck and Prakash for a closely related
(though not identical) communication model; the full version of the paper provides a detailed
proof for completeness, and in the process identifies the crucial details of the communication
model that enable the lower bound to hold.
I Theorem 5.20. For any function f and constant k, OMA[2k](f) = Ω
(
R[1,A](f)1/(k+1)
)
.
The main property of the OMA[k] communication model exploited in our proof of
Theorem 5.20 is the following: in any OMA[k] protocol P , for all i ≤ k, Alice can determine
Bob’s ith message to Merlin in P on her own. In particular, the same lower bound would
apply to any variant of online Arthur-Merlin communication models in which Bob’s messages
to Merlin must be independent of his input y. This is the intuitive reason why the OIP[2]
model is exponentially more powerful than the OMA[k] model for any constant k: in the
OIP[2] model, Bob’s message to Merlin may depend on his input y, while this is not allowed
in the OMA[k] model.
Combining Theorem 5.20 with Lemma 5.2, which says that OIP[2](index) = O(logn
log logn), we obtain an exponential separation between OIP[2] and OMA[k] for any constant
k > 0.
I Corollary 5.21. For every constant k > 0, we have OIP[2] 6⊆ OMA[k]. J
6 Conclusion
Our primary objects of study in this paper were constant-round interactive protocols for
verifying outsourced streaming computations. Our main algorithmic contributions were to
give constant-round streaming interactive proofs for a large class of “query” problems. Our
protocols are exponentially more efficient than what was believed possible based on prior
work, and demonstrate that in the streaming setting, “hidden” coins are exponentially more
powerful than public coins.
We also introduced new “online” communication hierarchies, OIP+ and OIP, which can
be seen as restricted variants of the standard Arthur-Merlin communication model. The
flow of information in the OIP+ and OIP models is severely restricted (neither Bob nor
Merlin can speak to Alice), yet OIP+ is still powerful enough to simulate any streaming
interactive proof, and OIP powerful enough to simulate all known streaming interactive
proofs. Our study revealed that the online nature of these communication models leads
them to behave very differently from classical interactive proofs, and allowed us to establish
strong limitations on the power of existing techniques for developing constant-round SIPs.
It also yielded a surprising characterization of the communication complexity class AM in
terms of online communication models (namely, AM = OIP[4] = OIP[4]+ ). We believe this
characterization may prove useful in establishing non-trivial AM lower bounds, a problem
that has been identified [23] as an important “first step” toward resolving the Π2 6= Σ2
problem in two-party communication complexity, one of the most important problems left
open by Babai et al. [5].
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Many questions remain for future work, but here we highlight just one: proving a
superlogarithmic lower bound on the OIP[2]+ communication cost of an explicit function.
Progress on this question would yield the first superlogarithmic lower bounds on the cost of
two-round SIPs. Moreover, we have shown that standard techniques easily establish that
OIP[2]+ is a subset of AM, but have been unable to prove any superlogarithmic lower bounds
against OIP[2]+ protocols. Proving OIP
[2]
+ lower bounds therefore represents an important
(and potentially tractable) “zeroth step” toward resolving Π2 6= Σ2.
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